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ABSTRACT 
This discussion paper considers insurance as a possible instrument of farm income stabilization 
and compares several crop insurance products with respect to their applicability in a transition 
economy using the case of Kazakhstan. The analysis is based on a qualitative evaluation as well 
a quantitative assessment of selected insurance products. The qualitative analysis reviews the 
available literature on the topic. The quantitative assessment completes the comparison 
introducing the findings of a numerical analysis of farm and weather data.  
JEL:  G22, Q14, D82 
Keywords: Risk, insurance schemes, agriculture.  
 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Dieses Diskussionspapier behandelt Ertragausfallversicherung als ein potenzielles Instrument 
der Stabilisierung der Einkommen landwirtschaftlicher Betriebe. Dabei werden einige 
Versicherungsprodukte auf ihre Anwendbarkeit in einem Transformationsland (am Beispiel 
vom Kasachstan) komparativ analysiert. Die Analyse wurde auf der Basis der theoretischen 
Beiträge zur Entwicklung des Versicherungsmarktes als auch der Ergebnisse einer numerischen 
Analyse der Wetter- und Betriebsdaten durchgeführt. 
JEL:  G22, Q14, D82 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Governmental interventions were an important part of agricultural policies in socialist countries. 
Unfortunately, these government actions often neglected conditions for economically-
sustainable farming. In the former Soviet Union, primarily output-oriented agricultural policies 
extended agricultural production even to marginal production areas, and thus created a 
significant misallocation of resources.  
Under the Virgin Land policy, 41.8 Million hectares (ha) were opened up for grain farming in the 
Soviet Union. In Kazakhstan, crop farming was extended from 6.7 Million to 21.9 Million ha 
from 1954 to 1964. Thereby, in addition to the areas suitable for crop production, much virgin 
land was ploughed in areas with poor soil quality and weather conditions which were 
unfavorable for crop production. Prior to 1991, the crop farming in Kazakhstan was extended to 
35.3 Million ha. In the Soviet times, production risks due to natural hazards and catastrophes did 
not affect farmers' incomes since their production losses were compensated by the government. 
Nowadays agricultural enterprises face high production risks and inevitably have to adapt to 
natural conditions. During the last 10 years, a drastic reduction of sown area has been 
observable. According to an official statistic, sown area was reduced from 35.2 to 17.8 ha in 
the same period (see Appendix A). The steepest decline of sown area was evident from 1996 
to 1998, when most parts of the country experienced drought, and as a result many farm 
businesses were forced into bankruptcy (GRAY, 2000). Territorially, the sharpest decline 
occurred in the regions which, due to their agro-climatic conditions, have a higher exposure to 
natural risks. In 2002, less than 33  percent of the total area sown in 1990 was being 
cultivated. As a consequence of different rates of reductions in the area cultivated in 
individual regions, regional structures of cultivated area underwent substantial changes as 
well. Currently, the most productive areas in Northern Kazakhstan cover about 63 percent of 
whole sown area. 11.5 percent of sown area is in the primarily irrigated production area in 
Southern Kazakhstan. These two regions have increased their share of production. Regions 
with many marginal production areas account for a little more than 25 percent of whole sown 
areas in the country. Though this development illustrates that much land where sustainable 
production is not achievable is taken out of cultivation, Kazakhstan is still confronted with the 
problem of high vulnerability of farm incomes with regard to unfavorable weather and 
production conditions in vast areas of the country.  
The extension of wheat production to areas with a high exposure to natural hazards was 
supposedly accompanied by an increase of a systemic, i.e., non-diversifiable, component in 
production risk. Natural hazards such as drought and extremely high temperatures typically 
affect a large number of farms over widespread areas in Kazakhstan simultaneously. This serves 
as an explanation for a high variation in the level of the national annual yields (Figure 1).  
The option of reducing production risks by applying on-farm risk management tools can be 
used only to a limited extent in a transition economy. Hard budget constraints, the lack of 
working machinery, and scarce working capital result in even less favorable conditions for 
crop production when compared to previous years (PETRICK, 2001). Like many of the former 
Soviet Republics, Kazakhstan preserved compulsory agricultural insurance in order to help 
farmers manage their risks. 
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Source: ROSTANKOWSKI, 1979; PETRICK, 2001; STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF KAZAKHSTAN, 2003. 
Up until 1997, insurance services for agriculture were provided by the state insurance 
company KazGosstrakh. In spite of the legal requirements for all legal farm entities to take 
risk insurance for all operations, the market for insurance remained under-developed and few 
farms were insured. Those, which did buy insurance usually did so only to meet formal 
requirements for other purposes such as access to credit (GRAY, 2000). In 1998, the 
Government established KazAgroPolis in order to develop a public-sector supplier of crop 
insurance. However, its operations remained very limited and, according to the National Bank 
of Kazakhstan (THE NATIONAL BANK OF KAZAKHSTAN, 2002) after its last restructuring in 
2001, KazAgroPolis lost its licence for providing any type of insurance services.  
In 2003, Kazakhstan’s government prepared a draft law on compulsory insurance in crop 
production. According to this document, private insurance companies were allowed to 
provide crop insurance, and the government was obliged to pay 50 percent of indemnity in 
case of crop failure. A survey of key actors
1 conducted in autumn 2003 showed that the 
insurance scheme proposed by the government contained many serious shortcomings and was 
attractive neither for insurance companies nor farmers. However, the Parliament passed the 
law in March 2004 to provide an insurance option to farmers. Nevertheless, no farm was 
insured in 2004, as many issues of the institutional framework with respect to the introduction 
of the new insurance scheme remain not solved.  
                                                 
1  The survey was conducted in the form of the structured interviews with members of Parliament, representatives 
of insurance companies, farmers' unions, regional administrations and insurance and agricultural experts. 21 
persons were interviewed in September-October 2003. 
 Crop insurance in transition: a qualitative and quantitative assessment of insurance products  9
There are many critical issues which explain the failure to develop a crop insurance in 
Kazakhstan. But, most of them could be separated into two major groups: Neglecting of 
general insurance requirements and specific issues with regard to transition process. 
Therefore the motivation of this study is to assess several insurance products with respect to 
their potential to be adequate to both general insurance aspects and particular problems of 
transition.  
This study is part of a research project on the analysis of requirements for the development of 
an economically-sustainable crop insurance in a transition country using the case of 
Kazakhstan. Particularly, the objective of this study is a comparison of several insurance 
schemes with respect to their ability to serve as an acceptable instrument of farm income 
stabilization in transition. The assessment is based on both the literature on the issue and the 
preliminary results of a numerical analysis of farm and weather data.
  The study uses 
extensively the results and data from a farm survey conducted in the framework of the project 
(HEIDELBACH et al., 2004). The author thanks Olaf Heidelbach for his helpful assistance in 
preparing chapters 2 and 3 of this discussion paper. A special word of thanks goes to the 
project associates Bota Borina and Darina Ostrikova who were extensively involved in the 
data collection. The author is also grateful for advice provided with regard to drought index 
application by Alexej Ivannikov from Agrarian University in Astana, Ludmila Chuntonova 
from Kazhydromet (Kazakh Hydro-meteorological Agency) and Irina Yesserkepova from 
Kazakh Research Institute for Environmental Monitoring and Climate. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives a short overview and systematization of the 
most current and widespread insurance products. Section  3 presents a discussion of the 
comparative advantages of two well-established and two relatively new crop insurance schemes. 
This discussion is followed by a quantitative assessment of the potential for introducing 
parametric (index) insurance in Kazakhstan. Conclusions are drawn in the final section.  
2 SHORT OVERVIEW OF INSURANCE PRODUCTS 
Crop insurance is used in many countries and a variety of crop insurance products are offered 
worldwide
2. Several relatively new insurance schemes are being investigated to respond to 
special needs and issues on pilot-basis. The diversity of insurance products makes it difficult 
to draw a clear distinction between them. Therefore, before starting an analysis of different 
insurance schemes, the most important insurance products will be presented and systemized 
to provide an understandable overview (Table 1).  
Generally, one can distinguish between all-risk, multiple risk and particular risk insurance. 
Two additional important groups of insurance schemes should be considered separately: 
Parametric and catastrophic insurance. At the same time, two mechanisms of crop insurance 
could be distinguished. The first mechanism is based on the actual production history (APH) 
of the farm. APH provides the base for different calculations using the insured’s historical 
yield records. Another mechanism of insurance is the so-called parametric or index-based 
insurance, which uses weather or area-yield indexes for pricing insurance contracts. Thereby, 
insurance payoffs are subject to the occurrence of a special weather event, which can be 
described by a weather-based index (SKEES, 1999). In case of area-yield insurance, average area 
yield "triggers" an indemnity payment which is equal to the difference, if positive, between the 
annual area yield and some predetermined critical yield (MIRANDA, 1991).  
                                                 
2  Most of them, however, were introduced in the USA, where crop insurance has a long history as an instrument 
of farmers' income stabilization. 
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The next distinction can be made regarding crop insurance products is the particular objective 
they are designed for. Primarily, one can distinguish between yield-only (or crop), revenue 
and income insurance schemes. In contrast to crop insurance, revenue and income insurance 
schemes provide protection against both production and price risks. 
Aside from this ordinary distinction, crop insurance products may be modified with regard to 
the following issues: 
•  Participation (compulsory versus voluntary participation); 
•  Contract duration (multi-year versus single year insurance contracts); 
•  Monitoring mechanism and technique; 
•  Re-insurance regulations; 
•  Deductibles, and 
•  Prices, which are used to calculate indemnity. 
An important distinction to be drawn pertains to the organizational form of insurance 
provision. In this regard, several options exist: Private and state-subsidized private insurance, 
insurance by the state and insurance on a mutual basis. 
Table 1:  Main crop insurance products 




Particular risk insurance  
Actual Production History 
(APH) 
Whole-Farm Income Insurance 
(NISA) 
Whole-Farm Gross Revenue 
Insurance (FGRI) 
Commodity Gross Revenue 
Insurance (CGRI) 
Income Protection (IP) 
Crop Revenue Coverage 
(CRC) 
Revenue Assurance (RA) 
Parametric Insurance  Area-yield Index 
Weather Index  
Group Risk Plan (GRP) 






(APH)  Catastrophic Coverage Level 
(CAT) 
Source: BOKUSHEVA and HEIDELBACH, 2003. 
This short overview shows that, although there exists a variety of insurance products at the 
moment, most of them bear a resemblance to each other and are based on the same features or 
functioning principles. In the following, the paper discusses four insurance products with 
regard to their capacity and applicability under transition circumstances. Particularly, the 
discussion concerns two well-known products, multi-peril yield insurance and farm gross 
revenue insurance, as well as two relatively recently-developed insurance schemes, area yield 
crop insurance and weather-based index insurance. All four insurance schemes are analyzed 
with regard to their comparative advantages regarding general issues as well as aspects that 
are especially important under the conditions of a transition country. 
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3 QUALITATIVE COMPARISON OF INSURANCE PRODUCTS  
In light of the complexity of challenges and many interdependencies between individual 
aspects of insurance market development, it is important to set up criteria which can help to 
compare individual insurance products. Though it is not easy to draw a clear division between 
individual aspects, the following assessment features were considered in this study: 
•  Insurability;  
•  Incentives for farmers to buy insurance; 
•  Incentives for private insurance to provide crop insurance; 
•  Possible effects on productivity and production patterns; 
•  Feasibility (applicability); 
•  Financial viability of insurance scheme. 
In addition the assessment considers several issues which are especially important in the 
transition context. The most important follow:  
•  Underdevelopment of financial markets; 
•  Possible presence of marginal production areas, and hence a higher exposure to 
systemic risks, which can seriously affect the development of financially-viable crop 
insurance;  
•  Large differences in farm productivity that can induce adverse selection; 
•  Information deficiency in view of complex farm restructuring and changes in 
production patterns;  
•  Underdeveloped market infrastructure, which lowers the profitability of farming; 
•  Low liquidity of farms, which can hinder their participation in crop insurance 
schemes; 
•  Many farmers had bad experiences with insurance during the Soviet era. This makes 
them cautious and less interested in insurance; 
•  Low attractiveness of involvement in agricuture on the side of private insurance, 
first of all due to high risk and transaction costs. However, not least due to low 
profitability of farming in general. 
A short presentation of the particular advantages and disadvantages of the considered crop 
insurance schemes with respect to the selected criteria is provided in Appendix B. Several 
issues, however, will be more precisely examined in the following. 
3.1 Insurability 
Past experience strongly suggests that not all risks are insurable. In agriculture in particular, 
many crop insurance programs fail to operate on an actuarially-sound basis. In theory, there 
are two attitudes towards the question of risk insurability. Among others, BERLINER (1982) 
underlines the requirement that it must be possible to make reliable estimates of the relevant 
probabilities from statistical observations. The implication is that a risk is insurable only if it 
can apply the law of large numbers. In the insurance sector, risk is classified as insurable as long 
as actuarially-sound premiums are charged. Actuarially-sound premiums have to accurately 
reflect the risks involved. However, actuarially-sound premiums can often be established only 
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at a very high premium or cannot be achieved at all (MEUWISSEN et al., 1999). With respect to 
the realization of the law of large numbers, a serious difference may be constituted only 
regarding two general options: Compulsory and voluntary insurance. In principle, every 
insurance product considered in this analysis can be provided in one of both ways. As 
mentioned before, many socialist countries tried to realize insurability by introducing 
compulsory insurance. Farms had to pay for insurance without any decision option (even if they 
did not need one). Moreover, the premiums established by the state insurance companies were 
not correlated with the actual risks involved, as premium rates were distinguished only 
according to relatively large territorial units (ZADKOV, 1997; PYE, 2000). Such developments 
induced negative experiences with insurance in the cases of successful enterprises and the 
free-riding behavior of loss-makers. The process of privatization in Kazakh agriculture has 
had a significant impact on the importance of risk for agricultural producers. Nowadays, 
farmers inevitably have to adapt their production to natural production conditions (PETRICK, 
2001). Thereby, they are looking for appropriate instruments of risk mitigation. As the results 
of a farm survey
3 show, 64.4 percent of the respondents would like to be insured. However, 
only 43.8  percent of this number believes that crop insurance should be compulsory in 
Kazakhstan (HEIDELBACH, BOKUSHEVA and KUSSAYINOV, 2004). A compulsory insurance 
scheme usually undermines the farmer’s decision-making autonomy and hence affects activity 
of individual farmers. In such circumstances, farms are forced to employ risk-management 
instruments which may not provide the best solution to the farm's problems, or must even pay 
for services which they do not need. This makes compulsory insurance rather different from 
transition goals, since it violates free decision-making and, respectively, production factors 
allocation. Additionally, a compulsory insurance scheme is usually heavily regulative, which 
prevents insurance companies from setting actuarially fair premiums. 
In addition, to realization of the law of large numbers, the literature specifies two further 
aspects that have an effect on insurability: Systemic risk and asymmetric information. In 
assessing the insurability of risks in agriculture, MIRANDA and GLAUBER (1997) identify both 
as basic conditions for risk insurability: First, the risks should be nearly stochastically 
independent across insured individuals; second, the insurer and the insured should have very 
nearly symmetric information regarding the probability distribution of the underlying risk.  
Contrary to automobile or fire risks, which tend to be independent, the crop-yield risk exhibits 
a substantial degree of correlation across space (MIRANDA and GLAUBER, 1997). As stated 
before, crop losses in Kazakhstan are often driven by natural disasters, which simultaneously 
affect a large number of farms over a widespread area. Drought and extremely high 
temperatures are the main natural hazards that induce systemic yield losses of grain producers in 
most important production areas there. In light of the high specialization scale of Kazakh 
agriculture, where grain currently makes up 80 percent of gross agricultural output and covers 
79 percent of the sown area in Kazakhstan (STATISTICAL YEARBOOK KAZAKHSTAN, 2003), the 
problem of systemic risk can be especially serious. The concentration of grain production in 
the northern regions in Kazakhstan with similar climatic conditions makes this issue even 
more severe (Appendix C demonstrates the correlation of regional grain yields). In this context, 
considering the capacity of an insurance scheme to treat systemic risk is of great importance in 
comparing alternative insurance products. As multi-peril yield and revenue insurance could not 
provide a solution for systemic risk, innovative insurance schemes have been considered in 
several countries. Currently, area-yield insurance and weather-based insurance are regarded as 
                                                 
3  This farm survey was implemented in October-November 2003 and May-June 2004. 73 farmers and 
managers of agricultural enterprises were interviewed in the different parts of the country during this time 
(HEIDELBACH et al., 2004). 
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the most appropriate alternatives to conventional insurance products. However, the high 
correlation among individual farm-level yields maY force insurers to charge a high risk premium 
which makes insurance unattractive (MAHUL, 2001). The problem in this context is that risk 
pooling is difficult to achieve between those who are exposed to the same type of systemic risk. 
Hence, to manage the problem of systemic risk in agriculture, risk pooling must be extended to 
other economic sectors, for example, by introducing financial market products such as weather 
derivatives. At the same time, considering the case of a transition country requires much 
attention to be paid to the economic viability of agricultural production in individual regions. If 
long-term farm profitability is not achievable due to unfavorable weather and production 
conditions in a region, risk pooling would not be an appropriate mechanism of farm income 
stabilization, since it would imply an income redistribution from profitable to unprofitable farms 
and, respectively, from more productive to less productive sectors of the economy.  
Asymmetric information manifests itself primarily in terms of adverse selection and moral 
hazard. Adverse selection in insurance markets is caused by the inability of the insurer to 
accurately rate the risk of loss of individuals who purchase insurance. Moral hazard is a result 
of hidden actions of the insured, which increase the risk of loss of the insurer. Theoretical and 
empirical studies (AKERLOF, 1970; ROTHSCHILD and STIGLITZ, 1976; MAKKI and SOMWARU, 
2001) have shown that adverse selection reduces the consumption of insurance by low-risk 
individuals or businesses, and results in the transfer of income from low-risk to high-risk 
insured. MIYAZAKI (1977) and WILSON (1977) demonstrate that, when it is impossible or 
highly-expensive to distinguish between low- and high-risk insurance applicants, the insurer 
prices insurance contracts at an average premium for all individuals. That results in 
undercharging high-risk customers and overcharging low-risk customers for similar contracts.  
Past experience suggests that most popular crop insurance schemes, particularly multi-peril 
yield insurance and revenue insurance, are rather prone to adverse selection and moral hazard. 
GOODWIN (1993) illustrates the effects of adverse selection on the actuarial performance of 
the US crop insurance program, demonstrating that only farmers whose risk is above average 
are likely to purchase insurance. The results of a study conducted by JUST  et al. (1999) 
suggest that participating farmers tend to be those with higher-than-expected indemnities, as 
farmers with lower-than-expected indemnities are priced out of the program. They conclude 
that the domination of high-risk farmers in the insurance market can lead to market failure.  
MIRANDA (1991) argues that area-yield insurance offers numerous advantages over individual-
yield crop insurance. Because information regarding the distribution of the area yield is 
generally available and more reliable than information regarding distribution of individual 
yields, insurers could more accurately assess the actuarial fairness of premiums under an area 
yield policy, thereby significantly reducing adverse selection problems. The use of an insurance 
product based on an index should eliminate the problem of asymmetric information between 
government and insurance companies, as well as between insurance companies and farmers, 
since all involved parties have symmetric information regarding the contract, and problems of 
moral hazard and adverse selection can be reduced significantly. However, SKEES and REED 
(1986) show that the potential for adverse selection depends on a farmer’s subjective 
assessment of the expected yield and the variability of the yield. They argue that premium 
rates based only on the mean crop yields of a region can lead to adverse selection, particularly 
when the variance of yield fluctuates considerably between farms. This aspect might be even 
more serious in a transition country, where farm productivity and production technologies could 
be rather heterogeneous in the initial stage. In this view, weather-based index insurance products 
provide some advantages because of the objective nature of the parameters that trigger 
indemnity payments. VARANGIS et al. (2002) argue that the weather can be independently 
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verified, and therefore is not subject to the possibility of manipulation. Pre-conditioned, 
reliable assessment of area-yield based insurance can have similar benefits to weather-based 
index insurance. 
3.2  Incentives for farmers and insurance companies to participate in crop insurance 
Realization of the law of large numbers is closely connected to incentives for farmers to buy 
insurance. If insurance is voluntary, then farmers’ participation in crop insurance would 
depend on, among other factors, how well it is suited to their needs. According to the 
conducted farm survey in Kazakhstan, features of insurance contracts such as sensitivity to 
changes in weather conditions (60.8 percent of the respondents), timing of contract fulfillment 
(44.6 percent) as well as the possibility of selecting a reasonable coverage (28.4 percent) and 
regional differentiation in contract design (24.5 percent) were referred to as main preconditions 
for the farmers' participation in crop insurance. Additionally, the farmers mention the cost of 
insurance as an important factor of their willingness to buy insurance. In this view, most 
farmers would tend towards insurance against only a group of the most serious natural 
hazards they face, as opposed to multi-peril insurance, provided that it would lower insurance 
costs. According to survey results, drought represents the most important natural hazard to 
grain production in the region, therefore, weather-based index insurance is likely to be 
accepted by farmers there.  
However, since other important risks cannot be insured under this insurance product, farmers 
with multiple risks may desire another insurance scheme to provide coverage against their 
further risks. On the other hand, insurance contracts that are designed to protect against losses 
from a multitude of hazards may present challenges in terms of accurately assigning a 
probability of loss and determining an appropriate insurance rate (GOODWIN, 2001). This 
issue is even more critical if only limited historical yield data is available, as is the case in 
transition countries, where, due to restructuring, new entities have been emerging. Using 
regional data, however, may not accurately reflect the true likelihood of losses for individual 
farmers. As MIRANDA (1991) suggests, area-yield crop insurance provides incentives to 
farmers whose yields strongly correlate with the aggravate area yield. As the farm survey 
results demonstrate, this applies for most large farms in the investigated regions. Therefore, 
this insurance product can find acceptance by large farmers in Kazakhstan as well.  
Furthermore, farmers, who in addition to high yield-variability face high price risk, could be 
interested in a revenue insurance scheme. In the context of an underdeveloped market 
infrastructure, price risk is of great importance to Kazakh farmers. According to the farm 
survey results, 64.4 percent of the interviewed farmers would like to have income insurance 
(HEIDELBACH et al., 2004).  
Another important aspect of insurance market development associated with insurability is 
readiness of the private insurance sector to extend their services to agriculture. As results of 
structured interviews with insurance experts in Kazakhstan show, insurance companies are 
strongly distrustful to business in agriculture. Most of them do not possess any expertise in 
providing agricultural insurance. Those small parts of insurance companies, which do have 
some experts in the field, do not believe that risks in Kazakh agriculture can be privately 
insured. Additional aspects that hold them from involvement in the crop insurance market are 
high administrative and transaction costs, problems with monitoring and controlling moral 
hazard, and heavy regulation of the crop insurance market. Considering that both, area-yield 
insurance and weather-based-index insurance possess some advantages compared to 
traditional insurance products with regard to the above-mentioned problems, they could serve 
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as an "lead-in" for private insurance during the initial stage of development in the private 
insurance market in a transition economy. However, area-yield crop insurance, as well as 
weather-based-index insurance, does not solve the problem of risk pooling when systemic risk 
is present. In this case, an engagement on the side of either state or financial markets is 
inevitable for dealing with the problem.  
3.3  Effects on farmer’s production patterns  
An important issue treated in the literature concerns effects of insurance on farm productivity 
and production practices (CHAMBERS and QUIGGIN, 2002; COBLE et al., 1997; SMITH and 
GOODWIN, 1996). Reducing farmers' risk through insurance has been identified as affecting 
land use and inducing changes in production decisions. The effects of crop insurance on 
production pattern changes originate from the fact that under crop insurance, risk-averse 
farmers will behave as if they were risk-neutral (CHAMBERS, 1989). In view of the problem of 
marginal production areas with less productive farms in Kazakhstan and some other transition 
countries, this effect of insurance can be even more serious and severely distort factor 
allocation. Crop insurance can motivate farmers to choose a riskier bundle of outputs, inputs, 
and production practices that make farming more risky. Regarding this general problem, the 
literature concerns the optimal design of insurance contracts. CHAMBERS (1989) considers a 
contract-based approach, where insurance is designed with respect to an incentive compatibility 
constraint based on the agent’s first-order conditions for choice of inputs. MIRANDA (1991), 
MAHUL (1999) and BOURGEON and CHAMBERS (2003) examined the design of area-yield crop 
insurance with regard to the farmers "beta"-coefficient relating a farmer's yield to the risk 
pool’s yield.  
On the other hand CHAMBERS and QUIGGIN (2004) argue that by having access to fair insurance, 
the producer does not need to engage in costly self-insurance. In the framework of state-
contingent approach the authors show that by looking for a cost-minimising bundle of risk 
management tools and the technology to reach the optimal level of state-contingent income, 
the producer will be required to equalise the rate at which the risk management tool and 
technology balance out the state-contingent incomes. In this context the challenge is to apply 
this approach to empirical investigations into crop insurance design and pricing. 
3.4  Feasibility and financial viability 
Feasibility of an insurance scheme plays an important role considering applicability and 
viability of an insurance product. From this point of view, index-based insurance schemes 
provide some important advantages over other insurance schemes. Primarily due to their 
capacity to reduce transaction costs on the insurance market. For instance, in the case of 
transition countries where many small farms have emerged, area-yield crop insurance could 
allow to manage to some extent the problems of limited data availability. On the other hand, 
as serious differences in farm productivity could be present during transition, using area-yield 
as a reference value for risk pooling should be considered with caution. Thus, weather-based 
insurance can be viewed as a more advanced insurance product under these circumstances. 
Like other crop insurance products, weather-based insurance cannot solve the problem of 
systemic risk pooling. However, due to similarities with weather derivatives, weather-based 
index insurance can prepare farmers for the potential adoption of such advanced financial 
instruments. An important precondition regarding the establishment of a weather-based index 
insurance product is the development of hydro-meteorological services and the provision of 
reliable and affordable weather information for insurance market participants. This issue 
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underlines the importance of institutional frameworks. As most transition economies 
experience high budget restrictions, policy-makers have to pay attention to the insurance 
schemes which can be run privately, without any subsidization, or only on a small scale. Most 
attention must, however, be paid to the institutional accompaniment of the development of 
rural financial markets, in particular the crop insurance market. 
At the initial stage of insurance market development, a great deal of attention must be paid to 
educating potential customers on insurance matters. In light of bad experiences with insurance 
during the Soviet era, farmers in most transition countries are skeptical about crop insurance. 
Hence, pilot projects must be started to convince farmers of the advantages of their participation 
in the initial stages of crop insurance market development. In this regard, a strong 
engagement of government and public agencies must be present.  
To summarize, in the view of a less-developed financial market in a transition economy, crop 
insurance can be considered as a possible instrument of a farmer’s income stabilization. The 
analysis shows that area-yield insurance and weather-based index insurance provide more 
advantages compared to multi-peril crop insurance and revenue insurance also in the 
transition context. These advantages include:  
•  AYCI and WBII are introduced to manage systemic risk; 
•  Since only systemic risk is to be insured, insurers can more accurately assess the 
actuarial fairness of premiums, and thus reduce the adverse selection problems; 
•  Both schemes have relatively low transaction costs; 
•  AYCI is better applicable given prevailing data limitations; 
•  WBII is less bureaucratic, and thus provides less scope for corruption; 
•  WBII is better positioned to avoid moral hazard because of objective nature   
of parameters that trigger indemnity payments. 
Nevertheless, some important issues remain unresolved even by introducing these advanced 
insurance schemes: 
•  AYCI and WBII do not solve the problem of risk pooling; 
•  Neither of them provide protection against price risk; 
•  There exists a danger that risk-averse farmers may change their production patterns 
in a way that increases systemic risk; 
•  AYCI can lead to adverse selection since it is based on average yields of a region; 
•  WBII is attractive for those farmers, who look for insurance against only one, most 
serious risk – other important risks cannot be insured; 
•  Risk-averse farmers could prefer farm-level insurance to area products, thus WBII 
might be more attractive for them compared to AYCI. 
With account of these critical issues both schemes have been considered in the quantitative 
analysis that is presented in the next section.  
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4 QUANTITATIVE ASSESSMENT OF INSURANCE PRODUCTS 
Weather-based index insurance is considered in the analysis by introducing rainfall-based 
index insurance (RII) and drought-index insurance (DII). In addition to area-yield insurance, 
they are evaluated with respect to their capacity to represent farmers’ risks accurately and 
provide a proper basis for assessment of an actuarially fair premium. 
4.1  Procedure and data 
To conduct the quantitative part of the analysis the study employs a procedure which contains 
the following steps:  
•  Index selection and design, estimation of the weights for the parameters included in 
an index; 
•  Numerical simulations to assess index distributions; 
•  Assessment of the expected indemnity and fair premium;  
•  Calculation of appropriate insurance price to assess the farmer’s readiness to purchase 
insurance.  
The most important steps of the procedure will be discussed in the next subsections. 
To evaluate yield dependence on the annual weather conditions, yield data from 12 large 
grain farms, in the Atbasar-rayon in the Akmola-region were employed. Yield data covers the 
period from 1983 to 2002. Different functional forms were used to de-trend the farm’s yields 
to account for technical change
4. Since no time trend was found, the further analysis uses the 
farm yields without detrending
5.  
Additionally, data from a weather station in the same region has been used in the analysis. 
Weather data corresponds to the period from 1974 to 2003 and encloses: 
•  Daily precipitation (mm),  
•  Average daily temperature (°C) and  
•  Productive soil moisture in a one-meter soil horizon on may 18 in respective years. 
4.2  Index selection and design 
As results of the farm survey indicate, drought presents a major source of production risk over 
widespread areas in Kazakhstan (HEIDELBACH et al., 2004). In view of the severity of the 
problem, much research has been done in Kazakhstan on the drought phenomenon, its 
consequences for agriculture, and instruments to manage its effects on farm. In the literature, 
drought is defined as a natural phenomenon induced by a continuous and substantial deficit of 
precipitation, accompanied by high air temperature, which, due to evaporation and 
transpiration, causes the drainage of productive soil moisture, and thus unfavorable vegetation 
conditions (SHAMEN, 1997). Three types of drought are distinguished: Atmospheric and soil 
drought as well as dry wind. To be able to assess its extent, different measures of drought 
were introduced.  
                                                 
4  Linear, piecewise-linear, second and third degree polynomial and exponential functions were considered.  
5  Appendix D illustrates the yield development patterns in several (randomly selected) farms in the considered 
rayon. 
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SELYANINOV (1958) (quoted in SHAMEN, 1997) suggested to identify drought by using an 
index accounting for the effects of two factors: Precipitation and temperature. He introduced 





HTC 10 ,                    ( 1 )  
where  ΣR is cumulative precipitation in mm during the period with an average daily 
temperature ≥ 10 
0C; ΣT is the sum of the average daily temperature in degrees Celsius in the 
same period. SELYANINOV demarcated weak drought when HTC ≥ 2, middle drought when 
2.0 < HTC < 1.0, and strong drought when 1 ≤ HTC ≤ 0.5.  
Later on, PED (1975) (quoted in SHAMEN, 1997) suggested to measure drought by means of an 
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where ∆R, ∆Q and ∆T stand for differences between long-term average and the i-considered 
period level of precipitation, soil moisture and temperature, respectively; σR, σQ and σT are 
their long-term coefficient of variation. Ped then defined the drought extent as weak if Si = 
1….2, medium if Si = 2.…3 and strong if Si > 3.  
More recently, another drought index was introduced by BOVA (GREENGOF et al., 1987), who 









where  W is the productive soil moisture in a one-meter soil horizon in springtime, R is 
cumulative precipitation from springtime until the moment of index assessment, and T is the 
sum of the average daily temperature in the period, with an average daily temperature ≥ 0 
0C. 
In this study, all three presented drought indexes are examined and serve as a basis for the 
development of a drought-index insurance product.  
To prove suitability of the selected indices to reproduce weather conditions in the individual 
years, their correlation coefficients with wheat yields for every of the 12 farms were 
calculated. Table 2 represents the minimum, maximum, and average correlation coefficients 
between the farm yields and annual magnitudes of different weather indexes
6. The average 
correlation coefficients are presented in the last column of the table. The results show that the 
performance of the indices is varying. The highest degree of dependence is observable in the 
case of area yield. All drought indices also possess a strong correlation with the yields of 
several farms. The maximum correlation coefficients reach values 0.81, 0.85, 0.87 in the case 
of the drought indices by SELYANINOV, PED and BOVA, respectively. It could be supposed that 
the highest correlation coefficients might be observable in case of the farms which are located 
in the weather station surrounding area. However, this was not always the case. By 
introducing data on the farms’ yields power we could find out that the highest correlations are 
characteristic for the farms in the areas with low soil quality (yield power less than 35 points). 
In the farms with higher yield power the correlation between the yields and the selected 
                                                 
6  First, correlation coefficients were calculated for every large farm in the rayon, then the highest and lowest 
coefficients were selected.  
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indices is lower. This indicates that weather conditions influence production in the farms with 
less productive soils more seriously than in those with relatively good soils. 
Table 2:  Minimum, maximum and average correlation coefficients between selected 
indices and farm-level yields (Atbasar-rayon in the Akmola-region) 
Summer Wheat  Minimum  Maximum  Average 
From 1983 to 2002 
Drought Index by Selyaninov*  0.43  0.81  0.50 
Drought Index by Ped*  0.52  0.85  0.58 
Drought Index by Bova*  0.52  0.87  0.56 
Cumulative Precipitation in the 
growing period, in mm  0.37  0.78  0.47 
Annual Precipitation, in mm   0.33  0.75  0.49 
Area Yield  0.74  0.98  0.79 
Note:  * Drought indexes were calculated to correspond to the growing period (June 1-August 31).  
Source:  Own calculation based on data, which was collected during the farm survey.  
In our further analysis we used all drought indices and the rainfall-based index in addition to 
AYI and applied them to a farm with a high correlation between yields and weather indices
7. 
To improve the performance of the selected indices we modified them by introducing 
monthly data and fitting them to the farm data. By means of least square regression the effects 
of the weather parameters (independent variables) on the farm’s wheat-yields (dependent 
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where R is the cumulative rainfall in a particular month, T – the average daily temperature 
between June 1 and August 31 and Q is the soil moisture as on May 18;  
Drought index by PED (modification 2), R
2=0.79 
                                                 
7  Descriptive statistics of the data employed is to find in the Appendix D 
8  Standard errors in parentheses. 
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where  R is the cumulative rainfall from June 1 to August 31; 
Drought index by BOVA (modification), R
2=0.77 
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where R is the cumulative rainfall, T – the average daily temperature from June 1 to August 
31 and Q is the soil moisture as on May 18. 
Since soil moisture is a parameter, which is related to soil cultivation intensity, using soil 
moisture as a parameter for an insurance product could induce moral hazard problems. 
Therefore, we modified the drought index by PED by replacing data on soil moisture through 
data on cumulative precipitation in the period from September and May. 
As it can be seen in (4) to (8) almost all parameters estimates are statistically significant; 
except the case of the parameter of cumulative precipitation between September and May in 
the Selyaninov-index and the same parameter in the rainfall-based index. Moreover, all 
selected weather-indices explain a substantial portion of annual yield volatility of the selected 
farm. The R-square measures range between 0.77 in the case of drought index by BOVA and 
0.81 for the first modification of the drought index by PED. Correspondingly, the range of 
correlation between the modified weather indices and the farm’s wheat yields is between 0.87 
and 0.90. However, in view of the above-mentioned concern with respect to use of soil 
moisture as a parameter for insurance pricing, we decided to exclude those drought indices, 
which enclose soil moisture measures, from an extended analysis.  
4.3  Assessment of fair premium and appropriate price 
In this section, four insurance products are evaluated with respect to their capacity to present 
an appropriate base for accurate insurance pricing and a proper instrument of production risk 
reduction.  
These are: 
•  Rainfall-based index insurance; 
•  Drought index insurance 1 (modification of the Selyaninov-Index);  
•  Drought index insurance 2 (second modification of the Ped-Index); 
•  Area-yield crop insurance. 
We compared these insurance schemes by considering their ability to provide an actuarially 
sound insurance pricing and evaluated them with respect to their accuracy in assessing fair 
premium and its correspondence with the actual yield loss. The actual loss was defined as an 
expected loss and thus is the expected negative difference between the farm yields in the 
individual years and the expected farm yield: 
)) ( ( ) ( y E y E Loss E i − = , (9) 
where yi is the yield in the year i (i∈T) and E(y) is expected yield.  
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Actual yield loss was calculated by employing the farm yield data corresponding to the period 
from 1983 to 2002. The insurance products were compared by considering the closeness of 
the assessed fair premiums to the actual loss.  
Distribution estimations and generation of the index values were done by means of @risk and 
several add-in-programs for MS-Excel
9. Two approaches were used to generate large numbers 
of weather-indices. The first approach employed the following procedure: Using historical 
weather data as a particular index was calculated, then its historical probability distribution 
was assessed and after that an index distribution with 10000 sample points was simulated
10. 
The second approach was based on the generation of a multivariate distribution of the 
parameters, which are included in the individual indices
11; in doing so, the correlations 
between the individual weather parameters were taken into account. In the first stage mean 
values, standard deviations of the index parameters as well as covariance matrixes were 
calculated, after that index parameters were jointly simulated as uniform variables of a 
multivariate normal distribution, and finally the generated weather parameter sets were used 
to calculate the index values. With regard to area-yield insurance only the first procedure was 
employed.  
Fair premium 
We used the generated index values to assess fair premiums and appropriate price of insurance. 
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where x is the index value in the individual years and  λ stands for liability.  
As it could be seen in equation (10), the indemnity function defines a weather-contingent 
contract as a put option, that would provide an indemnity if the index value falls below a 
strike level. In this study, the index strike level was defined as the average level of a 
particular index. To be able to compare the weather-index insurance products with the area-
yield insurance, in contrast to the studies on weather derivatives (TURVEY, 2001; BERG et al., 
2004), liability was set to correspond to the average farm’s wheat yield in this study. 
Moreover, all estimations were completed assuming 100 percent insurance coverage
12 and in 
0.1 tonnes per hectare.  
The assessment of fair premium in case of area-yield insurance was conducted by the 














where y stands for the realized area yield, αiµ  is the critical yield and φi responds the optimal 
level of coverage for the farm i (MAHUL, 1999; SKEES et al., 1997).  
                                                 
9  NtRand (Version 2.01) and Matrix.xla. 
10  According to the Anderson-Darling (AD) and Kolmogorov tests area yields in the considered rayon are 
distributed as a Weibull-distribution. With respect to the weather indices best fit was provided by a Log-
logistic distribution in the case of the rainfall index and drought index by Selyaninov (AD and Kolmogorov 
tests); drought index by Ped is distributed as an Inverse Gauss distribution with respect to Chi-square and 
AD tests. 
11  These parameters are presented with respect to the considered weather indices in the formulas (4)-(9).  
12  In the case of area yield insurance the optimal level of coverage was applied. To determine the optimal level 
of coverage the critical β as specified by MIRANDA (1991) was assessed by means of a regression equation. 
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Both indemnity functions were additionally employed to assess expected indemnity by means 
of the "burn rate" method. This method is often applied in actuarial practice and assumes that 
future losses will be distributed as in the past. In this analysis we assessed these values in 
addition to fair premium to prove the performance of the considered insurance products in the 
short-run using the yield and weather data from 1983 to 2002. 
Appropriate price 
To assess the readiness of farmers to purchase insurance, a formula derived by CHAMBERs 
and QUIGGIN (2004) in the framework of state-contingent approach can be applied. The 
appropriate price indicates the maximal price that the farmer is ready to pay for one unit of 








* ,   (9) 
where cs  are marginal costs in state s, ps stands for output price in state s, as represents 
payout (indemnity) in state s, w is input price, and finally zs is stochastic production in state s.  
The formula allows comparing farmer’s activities to manage risk through production 
decisions as well as an insurance. Thus, an insurance is plausible as far as it is not more then 
the cost of increasing revenue by one unit in every state of nature.  
Applying this formula to our empirical investigation we had to define the farm’s output prices 
and marginal production costs. This was a challenging task with respect to the data that was 
available in the framework of the study. Since no price and production data was available 
from the considered farm, the study employed regional price data over the period from 
January 2000 to June 2004 and used data on production costs, which were assessed for the 
current level of technology employed on most large farms in the respective agri-climatic zone 
of the Akmola-region (SIGAREV, 2003).  
To account for the possible presence of natural hedge, different levels
13 of correlation between 
output price and index values were considered. We considered correlation coefficients 
between output price and index values instead of the correlation between output price and 
farm yield because only these variables are introduced into the appropriate price formula. 
Output prices are introduced directly into the formula and index values are considered 
indirectly through the parameter as – indemnity, which is subject to the index value in state s. 
In case of parametric insurance the farm’s yields are not used for assessing indemnity, but 
natural hedge could be observed even better on a region-level, in our case the rayon-level. 
Thus, considering area-yield insurance it is legitimate to use the correlation between area 
yield and price. Further, since specific weather events determine farm yields, in case of 
presence of natural hedge they have to demonstrate a negative correlation with price as well. 
Therefore, in case of weather-index insurance we decided to concern this issue by accounting 
for a negative correlation between a weather-index and price. As the estimation results show, 
the appropriate price slightly decreases with increasing absolute values of the correlation 
coefficients between price and index values. This is in accordance with empirical evidence 
and shows that farmers are less willing to buy insurance when they can compensate their 
production losses by higher prices. 
The empirical estimation of marginal production costs in different states is an object of our 
further in-depth investigations. For the moment, we decided to assess this value by using the 
                                                 
13  In our analysis we considered the following values of the correlation coefficients: 0, - 0.1, - 0.3, - 0.5.  
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average instead of marginal production costs. Additionally, we had to assume a constant 
technology so as to use the same level of costs over all states of nature. This illustrates that 
our estimates of appropriate price are rather rough and should be considered just as an 
approximation. Consequently, a more advanced investigation is required to introduce the 
concept of appropriate price into empirical research. 
Estimation results 
In Table 3 the estimation results are presented with respect to the individual indices. The actual 
loss was calculated using the selected farms’ yields and has an expected value of 1.89 tonnes 
over the period from 1983 to 2002. The fair premium was assessed on the basis of the generated 
index values. Estimations of the expected indemnity as well as the appropriate price were done 
using historical weather data in the above-mentioned period.  
As the estimation results show there are some differences in the estimated values of the fair 
premium with respect to the simulation procedures of the index value generation; particularly 
in the case of the rainfall-based index and drought index 1. That can be explained by different 
assumptions with respect to the probability distributions. Using the parameters simulation 
procedure, a multivariate normal distribution was assumed. In the procedure of direct index 
simulation, Log-logistic distributions were employed to generate the rainfall-based index and 
drought index 1 (by SELYANINOV) and an Inverse Gauss distribution was applied in case of 
drought index 2 (by PED). 
Considering the estimations of the fair premium and the expected indemnity the lowest 
differences in their assessment could be found with regard to drought index insurance 2 and 
area-yield insurance. This indicates that these insurance products provide more precise 
estimates also in a short-run, and is an important aspect for actuarial practice.  
Comparison of expected loss and indemnity estimates shows that there is no insurance 
scheme which provides a complete coverage of the farm’s crop losses. This was to expect, 
since weather-based insurance provides protection against only one, usually the most important 
risk, in this case – drought, and area-yield insurance covers only systemic yield losses (e.g. 
idiosyncratic risk remains uninsured). However, all weather-based insurance products minimize 
the differences between expected indemnity and loss. This fact supports the argument that 
drought presents the most important natural hazard in the considered region.  
Further on, for all insurance products the estimates of appropriate price approach the fair 
premium values. However, as appropriate price identifies the maximum price that the farmer 
is ready to pay for an insurance, it must be lower than the insurance premium. With respect to 
rainfall-based insurance and drought index (1) insurance no clear assessment is possible: The 
ratio of fair premium to appropriate price varies between 0.95 and 1.01 and 0.96 and 1.11, 
respectively. Conversely, in the case of three other insurance products the estimates of 
appropriate price is definitely lower than the fair premium. This indicates good prospects with 
respect to the farmers’ participation in crop insurance.  
By way of summarizing the discussion of the estimation results, the analysis and comparison 
of the selected insurance products show that two of them, drought index (2) insurance and 
area-yield insurance, provide a better basis for developing crop insurance in the considered 
region. However, further investigations are necessary before these insurance products can be 
recommended for introduction. This concerns both empirical and methodological issues. 
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Table 3:  Preliminary results of a numerical analysis (data from a farm and a weather 
station in the Akmola-region; 100 % coverage; 0.1 t per ha)  

















1.64 1.62 1.64 1.60  1.65 
Fair 




1.54 1.47 1.66  n.a.  n.a. 
Expected Indemnity 
(estimated by burn rate 
method) 
1.67 1.73 1.68 1.57  1.63 
Appropriate price
3  1.56 - 1.64  1.55 - 1.63  1.54 - 1.62  1.43 - 1.50  1.48 -1.56 
Fair premium 
and indemnity
2  0.92 - 0.98  0.85 - 0.93  0.98 - 0.99  1.02  1.01 
Indemnity and 
loss  0.89 0.92 0.89 0.83  0.86 
Difference 





0.95- 1.01  0.96 - 1.11  0.93 - 0.99  0.89 - 0.94  0.90 - 0.95 
Notes:
 1  According to the estimates 104%; 
  
2 Minimum and maximum percentage; 
  
3 Estimated by assuming presence of natural hedge.  
Source: Own  estimations. 
Our investigations into insurance contract design were based on the data from only one farm 
in the considered region. It remains to be proven empirically whether and which of the 
considered insurance products provide an adequate instrument of risk management to other 
farmers in this as well as other regions of Kazakhstan. Additionally, substantial effort is 
necessary to improve the empirical application of the appropriate price concept.  
5 CONCLUSIONS 
Due to the slow development of financial markets and the scarce provision of financial 
services to farmers in many transition economies, crop insurance can present an initial 
instrument of farmers' income stabilization. The analysis shows that most of the important 
aspects of insurance markets in developed countries can be applied in a transition economy as 
well. However, additional issues can arise in establishing crop insurance in this context. 
Depending on the extent of these problems, several insurance products could be assessed in 
terms of their potential and applicability in an individual transition country. The complexity 
of the problems to be treated in the transition process involves and requires the gradual 
development of crop insurance markets. This would allow the accumulation of extensive 
knowledge and experience for the development of a long-term strategy which aims to increase 
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sustainability of farming. As first estimations show, in the case of Kazakhstan, introducing 
drought-index insurance or area-yield insurance for large farms in the grain-producing 
regions seems to have good prospects. Initial preconditions for that are analyzed in this study. 
However, in view of the problem’s complexity, further investigations are necessary. 
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APPENDIX 
Appendix A: Development of sown area in Kazakhstan during transition 
Total, th. ha  Share in sown area, %   Oblasts 
1990 2002  2002/1990 1990  2002 
Total  35182.1 17756.3  0.50  100.00  100.00 
Akmola 6393.8  4116.0  0.64  18.17  23.18 
Kostanai 6804.7  3614.3  0.53  19.34  20.36 
North KZ  4971.4  3413.1  0.69  14.13  19.22 
North Kazakhstan (area with  
extensive grain production) 
55342.0 30901.7  0.56  51.65  62.76 
Karagandy 2325.4  1129.6  0.49  6.61  6.36 
East KZ  2702.0  941.4  0.35  7.68  5.30 
Pavlodar 3389.7  849.6  0.25  9.63  4.78 
Aktobe 2706.6  821.5  0.30  7.69  4.63 
West KZ  2038.6  680.0  0.33  5.79  3.83 
Regions with marginal 
production areas 
13162.3 4422.1  0.34  37.41  24.90 
Almaty 1577.1  816.7  0.52  4.48  4.60 
South KZ  1074.3  731.4  0.68  3.05  4.12 
Zhambyl 861.1  498.0  0.58  2.45  2.80 
South Kazakhstan  
(irrigated area) 
3512.5 2046.1  0.58  9.98  11.52 
Kzyl-Orda 253.5  140.0  0.55  0.72  0.79 
Atyrau 82.2  4.6  0.06  0.23  0.03 
Mangistau 1.7  0.1  0.06  0.00  0.00 
Semi-desert area  337.4 144.7  0.43  0.96  0.81 
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Appendix B:  Comparison of insurance products with regard to their applicability in a transition economy 
Criterion  Multi-peril yield insurance 
(MPYI) 
Farm gross revenue insurance 
(FGRI) 
Area-yield crop insurance 
(AYCI) 
Weather-based- index insurance 
(WBII) 
compulsory: (+) more probable; (-) affects activity of individual farmer’s decision making; (-) more regulative. 
voluntary: (-) less probable, (+) through provision of a variety of individual insurance products can offer incentives to farmers to buy insurance, 
consequently, a higher farmer participation rate.  
(-) do not consider the problem.  (+) introduced to manage systemic risk (MIRANDA, 1991), however, subject 
to the extent of systemic risk.  
(+) potentially less AS, since only systemic risks are to be insured; 
Insurability  




Problem of asymmetric 
information 
(-) prone to moral hazard and adverse selection 
 
(-) since based on mean yields of a 
region, can lead to adverse selection, 
(SKEES and REED, 1986). 
(+) have more potential to avoid 
moral hazard because of objective 
nature of parameters that trigger 
indemnity payments. 
Incentives for farmers to 
buy insurance 
(+) almost all hazards can be 
insured; (+) more risk-averse 
farmers prefer farm-level 
insurance to area products  
(+) almost all hazards can be 
insured; (+) provides protection 
against price decline as well as 
low yields. 
(+) attractive for farmers if their 
yields strongly correlate with the 
aggregate area yield (MIRANDA, 
1991). 
(+) attractive for the farmers who look 
for insurance against only the most 
serious risk; (-) other important risks 
cannot be insured. 
Incentives for private 
insurance companies to 
provide crop insurance  
(-) high monitoring costs  (-) rather regulative; 
(-) high transaction costs. 
(+) relatively low administrative and transaction costs (MIRANDA, 1991; 
SCHNITKEY et al., 2003); (+) insurers could more accurately assess the 
actuarial fairness of premiums, thereby reducing adverse selection problems 
(MIRANDA, 1991); (-) area yield insurance does not solve the problem of 
risk pooling (MAHUL, 1999), the same regards weather-based -index 
insurance. 
(-) danger that risk-averse farmers may change their production patterns in a 
way that increases systemic risk (CHAMBERS and QUIGGIN, 2002), and thus, 
can increase production risk in general. 
Possible effect on 
productivity and 
production patterns  
(-) can affect use of on-farm 
risk-management instruments 
as well as alter production 
patterns. 
(-/+?) can have effects on 
productivity.  
(-) can restrain farmers from increasing their productivity and maintaining 
on-farm risk management instruments.  
Feasibility (applicability 
in a transition country) 
(+) mostly well-known in the 
post-Soviet countries, hence 
less avowal at the beginning; 
(-) high administrative costs 
(-) limitations in data
availability. 
 
(-) production structures in most 
farms are constantly changing: it 
is therefore necessary to reassess 
farm revenues often. Thus, high 
transaction costs are unavoidable 
(-) limitations in data availability. 
(+) feasible given prevailing data 
limitations (small individual farms) 
(SKEES et al., 1999); (-) there could 
be serious differences in farm 
productivity in initial stage of 
transition. This might make AYCI less 
attractive to more productive farms.  
(-) high initial costs for establishing a 
dense network of weather stations 
(costs depend on the actual state and 
density of the weather station net); 
(+) low administrative costs and less 
bureaucracy, thus less scope for 
corruption. 
Financial viability of 
insurance scheme 
(-) difficult to achieve in view of limited budget resources to 
subsidize insurance schemes.  
potentially possible (SKEES, 1999). 
Source: Own  presentation. 
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Akmola  1 . 0 0              
 
Aktobe  0.46  1.00            
 
Almaty  0.64  0.38  1.00           
 
Atyrau  -0.05  0.57  0.28  1.00          
 
East-Kaz  0.28  0.00  0.24  -0.07  1.00         
 
Zhambyl  0.67 0.41 0.94 0.23 0.20 1.00             
 
West-Kaz  0.35 0.54 0.33 0.63 0.22 0.41 1.00           
 
Karagandy  0.91 0.36 0.67 -0.02 0.38 0.64 0.29 1.00         
 
Kostanai  0.66 0.71 0.37 0.22 0.14 0.36 0.47 0.51 1.00       
 
Kzyl-Orda  0.25 0.31 0.11 0.05 0.38 0.13 0.37 0.24 0.40 1.00     
 
Pavlodar  0.64 0.05 0.49 -0.09 0.59 0.46 0.22 0.62 0.40 0.20 1.00   
 
North-Kaz  0.67 0.40 0.31 -0.13 0.32 0.33 0.43 0.54 0.79 0.52 0.61 1.00   
South-Kaz  0.67 0.63 0.83 0.45 0.14 0.84 0.50 0.69 0.54 0.35 0.38 0.40  1.00
Source: KUSSAIYNOV, 2003. 
 
Appendix D: Wheat yields of 5 selected farms and the rayon average yield from 1983 to  
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Appendix F:  Descriptive statistics of the farm’s and area yields and weather 
parameters  
(from 1983 to 2002, Atbasar-rayon in the Akmola-region) 
   Expected value  STD  Min   Max 
Farm yield, 0.1 t   8.4  4.6  1.3  17.0 
Area yield, 0.1 t   8.8 3.7  2.4  15.7 
Annual precipitation, mm  323.0  61.1  231.0  453.0 
Cumulative rainfall in June, mm  38.6  31.2  2.4  153.8 
Cumulative rainfall in July, mm  49.7  37.0  9.0  151.8 
Cumulative rainfall in August, mm  31.4  22.9  3.8  92.0 
Average daily temperature in June, 
0C 18.9 2.1  14.7  22.6 
Average daily temperature in July, 
0C 20.4 1.7  17.8  24.0 
Average daily temperature in August, 
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